Gun attacks in Jakarta, beheadings of western hostages in the southern Philippines and a wave of arrests in Malaysia this year have all had one element in common: Islamic State. It seems that 2016 is the year jihadist terrorism under the IS brand has emerged to pose a significantly enhanced threat to business and tourism across Southeast Asia.
Senior officials at the annual Shangri-La security conference in early June underscored the message by punctuating presentations with phrases such as “gathering storm,” “clear and present danger,” and “a deadly and growing threat.” Some independent experts have rated the threat level higher still: in mid-June Alex Bomberg, head of the UK-based Intelligent Protection International was widely quoted in the media as asserting that IS “is ready to do something in Asia” and that “it’s going to happen very soon.”
Access Asia does not share this assessment. We believe that since the Jakarta attack of 14 January 2016, analysis of the regional threat of terrorism has been infused with a degree of hysteria driven largely by the media and by academic experts invested in the study of terrorism and terrorist groups. There has also been a degree of overstatement from national-level leaders, not least Singaporeans, aimed at encouraging more robust regional cooperation on counter-terrorism (CT).
Terrorism threat in perspective
The situation in Southeast Asia is clearly far from benign and allows no room for complacency. That said, it should be recognised that terrorism is one of a range of security threats with the potential to impact regional economies and business confidence and, as matters stand today, is far from the most threatening. Over the coming year, cross-border haze, extreme weather events, cyber crime, and even brief but economically disruptive hostilities in the South China Sea are far more immediate concerns than major terrorist attacks.
Amplified by events in Jakarta, the current mood of alarmism tends to rest on a string of broad generalizations: IS is seeking to broaden its global ‘brand’; many recruits from Southeast Asia have left for the jihadist battle-fields of the Middle East; they will return battle-hardened to energise and train to fellow extremists; mayhem will inevitably ensue.
Access Asia believes this prognosis is flawed at several levels. It misconstrues the situation in the Middle East; overstates the current capabilities of regional jihadist groups; and underestimates the significant logistical and operational challenges involved in organising and conducting mass-casualty attacks. It also largely discounts the real improvements made region-wide over the past year in CT awareness and intelligence liaison.
This space does not permit detailed analysis of the various jihadist factions around Southeast Asia that have found it useful to wrap themselves in the black banner of IS, let alone of insurgent or terrorist groups more generally (although Access Asia is providing detailed assessments to clients.) However, a few key points do serve to place the terrorism threat in a more realistic perspective.
Firstly, closer scrutiny of the frequently touted threat of ‘foreign fighters’ in the Middle East simply does not support the contention that hundreds or even scores of trained terrorists will soon be returning to Southeast Asia. Of approximately 700-800 IS sympathisers from the region (mostly Indonesians) understood to have made the journey to the IS ‘caliphate’ in Syria and Iraq, an estimated 40 or 45 percent are women and children – a point seldom mentioned in media reporting. Many families have emigrated to the IS Promised Land with no intention of returning.
In terms of actual combatants, intelligence sources assess the strength of IS’s Southeast Asian battalion, the Katibah Nusantara, at approximately 250-300. These are mostly Indonesians but include around 50 Malaysians. Access Asia understands that to date combat fatalities have reached around 100, many of them occurring in recent months. As IS is increasingly pushed onto the defensive, casualties will inevitably rise further, while those inclined to quit will be viewed as deserters and apostates.
Finally, for those combatants or non-combatants who do succeed in leaving, the journey home via Jordan or Turkey will not be a simple matter of arriving at an airport and buying a ticket to Jakarta or Kuala Lumpur. The governments of both countries are now vigilant in interdicting the cross-border movement of Southeast Asians attempting to join or leave IS: up to March 2016, 250 Indonesians citizens had been detained and repatriated.
Secondly, the degree of attention accorded to Southeast Asia by IS leadership in either geo-strategic or operational terms is questionable. It is significant that despite – or perhaps because of – the number of small groups in the region that have declared allegiance to ‘caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS has yet to proclaim the formation of a ‘wilayah’ or province. While the group’s external operations executive would doubtless welcome further attacks along the lines of Jakarta, there is scant evidence that planning and supporting such operations is a priority on the level of high-impact attacks in Europe or Turkey. Rather, the evidence indicates that pressure for operations in the region has come from Katibah Nusantara commander Bahrun Naim, eager to burnish credentials at the IS ‘top table’ and outflank Indonesian rivals.
Thirdly, the Jakarta attack served to highlight the striking unpreparedness of Indonesian IS affiliates for terrorist prime-time. This was an operation carried out not by hardened returnees from Syria such as those that spearheaded the Paris operation, but by untrained amateurs pushed into action by leaders in Syria. Remarkably, a surprise assault using improvised explosive devices and firearms in a busy city centre resulted in only four civilians killed – the same number as terrorists who lost their lives.
There is no reason to believe that the capabilities of Indonesian jihadist groups – divided between those who have sworn allegiance to IS and those associated with older Jamaah Islamiyya (JI) networks who have not sworn allegiance to IS – has since improved. This is not to say that in the coming months attacks on provincial police stations or banks may not occur. It does though indicate that the likelihood of a complex, mass-casualty operation along the lines of the 2002 Bali bombings or more recent attacks in Europe is decidedly low.
Fourthly, the importance of the southern Philippines as a terrorist seedbed and springboard for regional mayhem has been grossly exaggerated. Several jihadist groups are active in the Mindanao and the Sulu Archipeligo where armed Muslim resistance to the southward spread of Christian rule is a centuries old tradition. Some of these have proclaimed their allegiance to IS and are known to have loose links to like-minded factions in Indonesia and Malaysia. They include notably the Sulu-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) which operates in Maguindanao region of south-central Mindanao, and the Ansar al-Khalifah Philippines (AKP), based in the coastal provinces of Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani.
Abu Sayyaf’s allegiance of convenience
Predictably, the release of a video early this year showing well-armed ASG fighters on Basilan island posing in front of IS banners and proclaiming fealty to the caliphate triggered a wave of dire predictions from academic terrorism experts. One spoke of “an unprecedented challenge to the Manila government” and even a threat to the security of Australia.
The reality for the medium-term is almost certainly more prosaic. While these groups do maintain temporary jungle camps which can be used for basic training, all remain under military pressure from the Philippine military and none of them control swathes of territory or population remotely comparable to the IS heartland or even IS ‘provinces’ in Sinai or Libya.
From its founding in 1991, the largest and militarily most capable group, the ASG, has been grounded in an ethnic Tausog tradition of piracy and raiding which has today translated into a lucrative kidnap-for-ransom industry with a thin veneer of Islamist ideological respectability. A journalist who covers Mindanao noted to Access Asia that a local government official revealed that IS banners have been absent in the most recent videos of ASG holding western hostages. The official’s explanation was that insurance policies typically don’t cover acts of terrorism and thus the group wants to maximise its potential for receiving ransom money from insurance payouts that do cover kidnap and ransom.
Over the coming year further kidnappings of foreigners and small-scale bombings are entirely likely in the group’s traditional maritime area of operations – which has long included the coastline of Sabah in Malaysia. But until and unless the ASG receives significant external funding for its efforts, there is no indication that it – let alone smaller, less capable groups – has any interest in attempting logistically complex terror attacks in cities of the Christian north.
Regional Counter Terrorism capabilities stronger since Bangkok bombing
Finally, several sources within the regional intelligence community note that the past year has seen a marked improvement not only in national CT capabilities but more importantly intelligence liaison both within the ASEAN framework and between ASEAN states and other major powers notably European states, China and Russia. This process began in the wake of the Erawan shrine bombing in Bangkok on 17 August 2015. Bringing together various strands of Thailand’s unique vulnerability to terrorism – weak border controls, rampant official corruption and the presence of trans-national organised crime – the attack not only shocked the international community but also dealt a severe jolt to the confidence of Thailand’s military government and security services. The impact of the incident as a catalyst for improved liaison was further reinforced by the Paris attack in November and the bungled attempt by an Indonesian IS affiliate to replicate the Paris model in Jakarta.
In conclusion, to the extent that we see the possibility of a significant IS-inspired outrage in the coming months, our focus of concern rests on Malaysia. The number of arrests made to date – 179 since February 2013 – attests to the vigilance and efficiency of Malaysia’s intelligence and security services. However, it also reflects a groundswell of sympathy for IS in the Muslim community which has been amplified by social media. As a proportion of a total population of 30 million, the number of Malaysians in Syria and Iraq today (approximately 75), is relatively far higher than of Indonesians from a country of 260 million. Notably many of those arrested have proved to be educated professionals with no connection to religious seminaries or other potential centres of Islamist extremism. Worryingly, they have even included some members of the armed services.
Against this backdrop, the possibility of a small, committed cell of technically competent extremists moving “under the radar” and staging a bomb or small-arms attack in a major city is arguably higher than elsewhere in the region.
Assessing the region’s terror threat in the longer term, it will be important also to watch the situation in Mindanao and the future of the stalled peace process with the region’s largest Muslim armed group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The collapse of negotiations with an essentially moderate group seeking a political settlement for autonomy would undoubtedly further stymie economic development and energise extremist factions. Much will depend on initiatives from the incoming administration of Rodrigo Duterte.
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Access Asia Consulting Company is a boutique risk management firm specializing in corporate investigations, due diligence, and security-related services across Southeast Asia and China. For further information or enquiries about our services, please contact [email protected]
